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Abstract: I survey physics theories involving parallel universes, which form a natural four-level
hierarchy of multiverses allowing progressively greater diversity. Level I: A generic prediction of
inflation is an infinite ergodic universe, which contains Hubble volumes realizing all initial conditions
— including an identical copy of you about 1010
29
m away. Level II: In chaotic inflation, other
thermalized regions may have different physical constants, dimensionality and particle content. Level
III: In unitary quantum mechanics, other branches of the wavefunction add nothing qualitatively
new, which is ironic given that this level has historically been the most controversial. Level IV:
Other mathematical structures give different fundamental equations of physics. The key question is
not whether parallel universes exist (Level I is the uncontroversial cosmological concordance model),
but how many levels there are. I discuss how multiverse models can be falsified and argue that there
is a severe “measure problem” that must be solved to make testable predictions at levels II-IV.
Is there another copy of you reading this article, decid-
ing to put it aside without finishing this sentence while
you are reading on? A person living on a planet called
Earth, with misty mountains, fertile fields and sprawling
cities, in a solar system with eight other planets. The
life of this person has been identical to yours in every
respect – until now, that is, when your decision to read
on signals that your two lives are diverging.
You probably find this idea strange and implausible,
and I must confess that this is my gut reaction too. Yet
it looks like we will just have to live with it, since the
simplest and most popular cosmological model today pre-
dicts that this person actually exists in a Galaxy about
1010
29
meters from here. This does not even assume spec-
ulative modern physics, merely that space is infinite and
rather uniformly filled with matter as indicated by recent
astronomical observations. Your alter ego is simply a pre-
diction of the so-called concordance model of cosmology,
which agrees with all current observational evidence and
is used as the basis for most calculations and simulations
presented at cosmology conferences. In contrast, alter-
natives such as a fractal universe, a closed universe and
a multiply connected universe have been seriously chal-
lenged by observations.
The farthest you can observe is the distance that light
has been able to travel during the 14 billion years since
the big-bang expansion began. The most distant visible
objects are now about 4×1026 meters away∗, and a sphere
∗After emitting the light that is now reaching us, the most
distant things we can see have receded because of the cosmic
expansion, and are now about about 40 billion light years
away.
of this radius defines our observable universe, also called
our Hubble volume, our horizon volume or simply our
universe. Likewise, the universe of your above-mentioned
twin is a sphere of the same size centered over there, none
of which we can see or have any causal contact with yet.
This is the simplest (but far from the only) example of
parallel universes.
By this very definition of “universe”, one might ex-
pect the notion that our observable universe is merely a
small part of a larger “multiverse” to be forever in the do-
main of metaphysics. Yet the epistemological borderline
between physics and metaphysics is defined by whether
a theory is experimentally testable, not by whether it
is weird or involves unobservable entities. Technology-
powered experimental breakthroughs have therefore ex-
panded the frontiers of physics to incorporate ever more
abstract (and at the time counterintuitive) concepts such
as a round rotating Earth, an electromagnetic field,
time slowdown at high speeds, quantum superpositions,
curved space and black holes. As reviewed in this ar-
ticle, it is becoming increasingly clear that multiverse
models grounded in modern physics can in fact be em-
pirically testable, predictive and falsifiable. Indeed, as
many as four distinct types of parallel universes (Figure
1) have been discussed in the recent scientific literature,
so that the key question is not whether there is a multi-
verse (since Level I is rather uncontroversial), but rather
how many levels it has.
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I. LEVEL I: REGIONS BEYOND OUR COSMIC
HORIZON
Let us return to your distant twin. If space is infi-
nite and the distribution of matter is sufficiently uniform
on large scales, then even the most unlikely events must
take place somewhere. In particular, there are infinitely
many other inhabited planets, including not just one but
infinitely many with people with the same appearance,
name and memories as you. Indeed, there are infinitely
many other regions the size of our observable universe,
where every possible cosmic history is played out. This
is the Level I multiverse.
A. Evidence for Level I parallel universes
Although the implications may seem crazy and
counter-intuitive, this spatially infinite cosmological
model is in fact the simplest and most popular one on
the market today. It is part of the cosmological concor-
dance model, which agrees with all current observational
evidence and is used as the basis for most calculations
and simulations presented at cosmology conferences. In
contrast, alternatives such as a fractal universe, a closed
universe and a multiply connected universe have been se-
riously challenged by observations. Yet the Level I mul-
tiverse idea has been controversial (indeed, an assertion
along these lines was one of the heresies for which the Vat-
ican had Giordano Bruno burned at the stake in 1600†),
so let us review the status of the two assumptions (infi-
nite space and “sufficiently uniform” distribution).
How large is space? Observationally, the lower bound
has grown dramatically (Figure 2) with no indication of
an upper bound. We all accept the existence of things
that we cannot see but could see if we moved or waited,
like ships beyond the horizon. Objects beyond cosmic
horizon have similar status, since the observable universe
grows by a light-year every year as light from further
away has time to reach us‡. Since we are all taught about
simple Euclidean space in school, it can therefore be dif-
ficult to imagine how space could not be infinite — for
what would lie beyond the sign saying “SPACE ENDS
HERE — MIND THE GAP”? Yet Einstein’s theory of
gravity allows space to be finite by being differently con-
nected than Euclidean space, say with the topology of
†Bruno’s ideas have since been elaborated by, e.g., Brundrit
(1979), Garriga & Vilenkin (2001b) and Ellis (2002), all of
whom have thus far avoided the stake.
‡If the cosmic expansion continues to accelerate (currently
an open question), the observable universe will eventually stop
growing.
a four-dimensional sphere or a doughnut so that travel-
ing far in one direction could bring you back from the
opposite direction. The cosmic microwave background
allows sensitive tests of such finite models, but has so
far produced no support for them — flat infinite models
fit the data fine and strong limits have been placed on
both spatial curvature and multiply connected topolo-
gies. In addition, a spatially infinite universe is a generic
prediction of the cosmological theory of inflation (Gar-
riga & Vilenkin 2001b). The striking successes of infla-
tion listed below therefore lend further support to the
idea that space is after all simple and infinite just as we
learned in school.
How uniform is the matter distribution on large scales?
In an “island universe” model where space is infinite but
all the matter is confined to a finite region, almost all
members of the Level I multiverse would be dead, con-
sisting of nothing but empty space. Such models have
been popular historically, originally with the island be-
ing Earth and the celestial objects visible to the naked
eye, and in the early 20th century with the island being
the known part of the Milky Way Galaxy. Another non-
uniform alternative is a fractal universe, where the mat-
ter distribution is self-similar and all coherent structures
in the cosmic galaxy distribution are merely a small part
of even larger coherent structures. The island and fractal
universe models have both been demolished by recent ob-
servations as reviewed in Tegmark (2002). Maps of the
three-dimensional galaxy distribution have shown that
the spectacular large-scale structure observed (galaxy
groups, clusters, superclusters, etc.) gives way to dull
uniformity on large scales, with no coherent structures
larger than about 1024m. More quantitatively, imagine
placing a sphere of radius R at various random locations,
measuring how much mass M is enclosed each time, and
computing the variation between the measurements as
quantified by their standard deviation ∆M . The relative
fluctuations ∆M/M have been measured to be of order
unity on the scale R ∼ 3×1023m, and dropping on larger
scales. The Sloan Digital Sky Survey has found ∆M/M
as small as 1% on the scale R ∼ 1025m and cosmic mi-
crowave background measurements have established that
the trend towards uniformity continues all the way out to
the edge of our observable universe (R ∼ 1027m), where
∆M/M ∼ 10−5. Barring conspiracy theories where the
universe is designed to fool us, the observations thus
speak loud and clear: space as we know it continues far
beyond the edge of our observable universe, teeming with
galaxies, stars and planets.
B. What are Level I parallel universes like?
The physics description of the world is traditionally
split into two parts: initial conditions and laws of physics
specifying how the initial conditions evolve. Observers
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FIG. 2. Although an infinite universe has always been a
possibility, the lower limit on the size of our universe has kept
growing.
living in parallel universes at Level I observe the exact
same laws of physics as we do, but with different initial
conditions than those in our Hubble volume. The cur-
rently favored theory is that the initial conditions (the
densities and motions of different types of matter early
on) were created by quantum fluctuations during the in-
flation epoch (see section 3). This quantum mechanism
generates initial conditions that are for all practical pur-
poses random, producing density fluctuations described
by what mathematicians call an ergodic random field.§
Ergodic means that if you imagine generating an ensem-
ble of universes, each with its own random initial con-
ditions, then the probability distribution of outcomes in
a given volume is identical to the distribution that you
get by sampling different volumes in a single universe. In
other words, it means that everything that could in prin-
ciple have happened here did in fact happen somewhere
else.
Inflation in fact generates all possible initial conditions
with non-zero probability, the most likely ones being al-
most uniform with fluctuations at the 10−5 level that
are amplified by gravitational clustering to form galaxies,
§Strictly speaking, the random field is ergodic if 1) Space
is infinite, 2) the mass fluctuations ∆M/M approach zero on
large scales (as measurements suggest), and 3) the densities at
any set of points has a multivariate Gaussian probability dis-
tribution (as predicted by the most popular inflation models,
which can be traced back to the fact that the harmonic oscil-
lator equation governing the inflaton field fluctuations gives a
Gaussian wavefunction for the ground state). For the techni-
cal reader, conditions 2 and 3 can be replaced by the weaker
requirement that correlation functions of all order vanish in
the limit of infinite spatial separation.
stars, planets and other structures. This means both that
pretty much all imaginable matter configurations occur
in some Hubble volume far away, and also that we should
expect our own Hubble volume to be a fairly typical one
— at least typical among those that contain observers.
A crude estimate suggests that the closest identical copy
of you is about ∼ 1010
29
m away. About ∼ 1010
91
m away,
there should be a sphere of radius 100 light-years identical
to the one centered here, so all perceptions that we have
during the next century will be identical to those of our
counterparts over there. About ∼ 1010
115
m away, there
should be an entire Hubble volume identical to ours.∗∗
This raises an interesting philosophical point that will
come back and haunt us in Section VB: if there are
indeed many copies of “you” with identical past lives and
memories, you would not be able to compute your own
future even if you had complete knowledge of the entire
state of the cosmos! The reason is that there is no way
for you to determine which of these copies is “you” (they
all feel that they are). Yet their lives will typically begin
to differ eventually, so the best you can do is predict
probabilities for what you will experience from now on.
This kills the traditional notion of determinism.
C. How a multiverse theory can be tested and
falsified
Is a multiverse theory one of metaphysics rather than
physics? As emphasized by Karl Popper, the distinc-
tion between the two is whether the theory is empirically
testable and falsifiable. Containing unobservable enti-
ties does clearly not per se make a theory non-testable.
For instance, a theory stating that there are 666 paral-
lel universes, all of which are devoid of oxygen makes
the testable prediction that we should observe no oxygen
here, and is therefore ruled out by observation.
As a more serious example, the Level I multiverse
framework is routinely used to rule out theories in mod-
∗∗This is an extremely conservative estimate, simply count-
ing all possible quantum states that a Hubble volume can have
that are no hotter than 108K. 10115 is roughly the number of
protons that the Pauli exclusion principle would allow you
to pack into a Hubble volume at this temperature (our own
Hubble volume contains only about 1080 protons). Each of
these 10115 slots can be either occupied or unoccupied, giving
N = 210
115
∼ 1010
115
possibilities, so the expected distance to
the nearest identical Hubble volume is N1/3 ∼ 1010
115
Hub-
ble radii ∼ 1010
115
meters. Your nearest copy is likely to be
much closer than 1010
29
meters, since the planet formation
and evolutionary processes that have tipped the odds in your
favor are at work everywhere. There are probably at least
1020 habitable planets in our own Hubble volume alone.
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ern cosmology, although this is rarely spelled out explic-
itly. For instance, cosmic microwave background (CMB)
observations have recently shown that space has almost
no curvature. Hot and cold spots in CMB maps have a
characteristic size that depends on the curvature of space,
and the observed spots appear too large to be consis-
tent with the previously popular “open universe” model.
However, the average spot size randomly varies slightly
from one Hubble volume to another, so it is important to
be statistically rigorous. When cosmologists say that the
open universe model is ruled out at 99.9% confidence,
they really mean that if the open universe model were
true, then fewer than one out of every thousand Hubble
volumes would show CMB spots as large as those we ob-
serve — therefore the entire model with all its infinitely
many Hubble volumes is ruled out, even though we have
of course only mapped the CMB in our own particular
Hubble volume.
The lesson to learn from this example is that multi-
verse theories can be tested and falsified, but only if they
predict what the ensemble of parallel universes is and
specify a probability distribution (or more generally what
mathematicians call a measure) over it. As we will see in
Section VB, this measure problem can be quite serious
and is still unsolved for some multiverse theories.
II. LEVEL II: OTHER POST-INFLATION
BUBBLES
If you felt that the Level I multiverse was large and
hard to stomach, try imagining an infinite set of distinct
ones (each symbolized by a bubble in Figure 1), some per-
haps with different dimensionality and different physical
constants. This is what is predicted by the the currently
popular chaotic theory of inflation, and we will refer to
it as the Level II multiverse. These other domains are
more than infinitely far away in the sense that you would
never get there even if you traveled at the speed of light
forever. The reason is that the space between our Level I
multiverse and its neighbors is still undergoing inflation,
which keeps stretching it out and creating more volume
faster than you can travel through it. In contrast, you
could travel to an arbitrarily distant Level I universe if
you were patient and the cosmic expansion decelerates.††
††Astronomical evidence suggests that the cosmic expansion
is currently accelerating. If this acceleration continues, then
even the level I parallel universes will remain forever sepa-
rate, with the intervening space stretching faster than light
can travel through it. The jury is still out, however, with
popular models predicting that the universe will eventually
stop accelerating and perhaps even recollapse.
A. Evidence for Level II parallel universes
By the 1970’s, the Big Bang model had proved a highly
successful explanation of most of the history of our uni-
verse. It had explained how a primordial fireball ex-
panded and cooled, synthesized Helium and other light
elements during the first few minutes, became transpar-
ent after 400,000 years releasing the cosmic microwave
background radiation, and gradually got clumpier due
to gravitational clustering, producing galaxies, stars and
planets. Yet disturbing questions remained about what
happened in the very beginning. Did something appear
from nothing? Where are all the superheavy particles
known as magnetic monopoles that particle physics pre-
dicts should be created early on (the “monopole prob-
lem”)? Why is space so big, so old and so flat, when
generic initial conditions predict curvature to grow over
time and the density to approach either zero or infinity
after of order 10−42 seconds (the “flatness problem”)?
What conspiracy caused the CMB temperature to be
nearly identical in regions of space that have never been
in causal contact (the “horizon problem”)? What mech-
anism generated the 10−5 level seed fluctuations out of
which all structure grew?
A process known as inflation can solve all these prob-
lems in one fell swoop (see reviews by Guth & Stein-
hardt 1984 and Linde 1994), and has therefore emerged
as the most popular theory of what happened very early
on. Inflation is a rapid stretching of space, diluting
away monopoles and other debris, making space flat and
uniform like the surface of an expanding balloon, and
stretching quantum vacuum fluctuations into macroscop-
ically large density fluctuations that can seed galaxy for-
mation. Since its inception, inflation has passed addi-
tional tests: CMB observations have found space to be
extremely flat and have measured the seed fluctuations
to have an approximately scale-invariant spectrum with-
out a substantial gravity wave component, all in perfect
agreement with inflationary predictions.
Inflation is a general phenomenon that occurs in a wide
class of theories of elementary particles. In the popular
model known as chaotic inflation, inflation ends in some
regions of space allowing life as we know it, whereas quan-
tum fluctuations cause other regions of space to inflate
even faster. In essence, one inflating bubble sprouts other
inflationary bubbles, which in turn produce others in a
never-ending chain reaction (Figure 1, lower left, with
time increasing upwards). The bubbles where inflation
has ended are the elements of the Level II multiverse.
Each such bubble is infinite in size‡‡, yet there are in-
‡‡Surprisingly, it has been shown that inflation can produce
an infinite Level I multiverse even in a bubble of finite spatial
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finitely many bubbles since the chain reaction never ends.
Indeed, if this exponential growth of the number of bub-
bles has been going on forever, there will be an uncount-
able infinity of such parallel universes (the same infinity
as that assigned to the set of real numbers, say, which
is larger than that of the [countably infinite] set of inte-
gers). In this case, there is also no beginning of time and
no absolute Big Bang: there is, was and always will be an
infinite number of inflating bubbles and post-inflationary
regions like the one we inhabit, forming a fractal pattern.
B. What are Level II parallel universes like?
The prevailing view is that the physics we observe to-
day is merely a low-energy limit of a much more symmet-
ric theory that manifests itself at extremely high temper-
atures. This underlying fundamental theory may be 11-
dimensional, supersymmetric and involving a grand uni-
fication of the four fundamental forces of nature. A com-
mon feature in such theories is that the potential energy
of the field(s) driving inflation has several different min-
ima (sometimes called “vacuum states”), corresponding
to different ways of breaking this symmetry and, as a re-
sult, to different low-energy physics. For instance, all but
three spatial dimensions could be curled up (“compacti-
fied”), resulting in an effectively three-dimensional space
like ours, or fewer could curl up leaving a 7-dimensional
space. The quantum fluctuations driving chaotic infla-
tion could cause different symmetry breaking in different
bubbles, resulting in different members of the Level II
multiverse having different dimensionality. Many sym-
metries observed in particle physics also result from the
specific way in which symmetry is broken, so there could
be Level II parallel universes where there are, say, two
rather than three generations of quarks.
In addition to such discrete properties as dimension-
ality and fundamental particles, our universe is char-
acterized by a set of dimensionless numbers known as
physical constants. Examples include the electron/proton
mass ratiomp/me ≈ 1836 and the cosmological constant,
which appears to be about 10−123 in so-called Planck
units. There are models where also such continuous pa-
rameters can vary from one one post-inflationary bubble
to another.§§
volume, thanks to an effect whereby the spatial directions of
spacetime curve towards the (infinite) time direction (Bucher
& Spergel 1999).
§§Although the fundamental equations of physics are the
same throughout the Level II multiverse, the approximate
effective equations governing the low-energy world that we
observe will differ. For instance, moving from a three-
dimensional to a four-dimensional (non-compactified) space
The Level II multiverse is therefore likely to be more
diverse than the Level I multiverse, containing domains
where not only the initial conditions differ, but per-
haps the dimensionality, the elementary particles and the
physical constants differ as well.
Before moving on, let us briefly comment on a few
closely related multiverse notions. First of all, if one
Level II multiverse can exist, eternally self-reproducing in
a fractal pattern, then there may well be infinitely many
other Level II multiverses that are completely discon-
nected. However, this variant appears to be untestable,
since it would neither add any qualitatively different
worlds nor alter the probability distribution for their
properties. All possible initial initial conditions and sym-
metry breakings are already realized within each one.
An idea proposed by Tolman and Wheeler and recently
elaborated by Steinhardt & Turok (2002) is that the
(Level I) multiverse is cyclic, going through an infinite
series of Big Bangs. If it exists, the ensemble of such in-
carnations would also form a multiverse, arguably with
a diversity similar to that of Level II.
An idea proposed by Smolin (1997) involves an ensem-
ble similar in diversity to that of Level II, but mutating
and sprouting new universes through black holes rather
than during inflation. This predicts a form of a natu-
ral selection favoring universes with maximal black hole
production.
In braneworld scenarios, another 3-dimensional world
could be quite literally parallel to ours, merely offset in a
higher dimension. However, it is unclear whether such a
world (“brane”) deserves be be called a parallel universe
separate from our own, since we may be able to interact
with it gravitationally much as we do with dark matter.
C. Fine-tuning and selection effects
Physicists dislike unexplained coincidences. Indeed,
they interpret them as evidence that models are ruled
out. In Section IC, we saw how the open universe model
was ruled out at 99.9% confidence because it implies that
the observed pattern of CMB fluctuations is extremely
unlikely, a one-in-a thousand coincidence occurring in
only 0.1% of all Hubble volumes.
changes the observed gravitational force equation from an in-
verse square law to an inverse cube law. Likewise, breaking
the underlying symmetries of particle physics differently will
change the lineup of elementary particles and the effective
equations that describe them. However, we will reserve the
terms “different equations” and “different laws of physics” for
the Level IV multiverse, where it is the fundamental rather
than effective equations that change.
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FIG. 3. Why we should not be surprised to find ourselves
living in 3+1-dimensional spacetime. When the partial dif-
ferential equations of nature are elliptic or ultrahyperbolic,
physics has no predictive power for an observer. In the re-
maining (hyperbolic) cases, n > 3 admits no stable atoms and
n < 3 may lack sufficient complexity for observers (no grav-
itational attraction, topological problems). From Tegmark
(1997).
Suppose you check into a hotel, are assigned room 1967
and, surprised, note that that this is the year you were
born. After a moment of reflection, you conclude that
this is not all that surprising after all, given that the hotel
has many rooms and that you would not be having these
thoughts in the first place if you’d been assigned another
one. You then realize that even if you knew nothing
about hotels, you could have inferred the existence of
other hotel rooms, because if there were only one room
number in the entire universe, you would be left with an
unexplained coincidence.
As a more pertinent example, consider M , the mass of
the Sun. M affects the luminosity of the Sun, and us-
ing basic physics, one can compute that life as we know
it on Earth is only possible if M is in the narrow range
1.6× 1030kg− 2.4× 1030kg — otherwise Earth’s climate
would be colder than on Mars or hotter than on Venus.
The measured value is M ∼ 2.0× 1030kg. This apparent
coincidence of the habitable and observedM -values may
appear disturbing given that calculations show that stars
in the much broader mass range M ∼ 1029kg − 1032kg
can exist. However, just as in the hotel example, we can
explain this apparent coincidence if there is an ensem-
ble and a selection effect: if there are in fact many solar
systems with a range of sizes of the central star and the
planetary orbits, then we obviously expect to find our-
selves living in one of the inhabitable ones.
FIG. 4. Hints of fine-tuning for the parameters α and αs
which determine the strengths of the electromagnetic force
and the strong nuclear force, respectively (from Tegmark
1997). The observed values (α,αs) ≈ (1/137, 0.1) are indi-
cated with a filled square. Grand unified theories rule out
everything except the narrow strip between the two vertical
lines, and deuterium becomes unstable below the horizontal
line. In the narrow shaded region to the very left, electro-
magnetism is weaker than gravity and therefore irrelevant.
More generally, the apparent coincidence of the hab-
itable and observed values of some physical parameter
can be taken as evidence for the existence of a larger en-
semble, of which what we observe is merely one member
among many (Carter 1973). Although the existence of
other hotel rooms and solar systems is uncontroversial
and observationally confirmed, that of parallel universes
is not, since they cannot be observed. Yet if fine-tuning
is observed, one can argue for their existence using the
exact same logic as above. Indeed, there are numerous
examples of fine tuning suggesting parallel universes with
other physical constants, although the degree of fine tun-
ing is still under active debate and should be clarified
by additional calculations — see Rees (2002) and Davies
(1982) for popular accounts and Barrow & Tipler (1986)
for technical details.
For instance, if the electromagnetic force were weak-
ened by a mere 4%, then the Sun would immediately
explode (the diproton would have a bound state, which
would increase the solar luminosity by a factor 1018). If
it were stronger, there would be fewer stable atoms. In-
deed, most if not all the parameters affecting low-energy
physics appear fine-tuned at some level, in the sense that
changing them by modest amounts results in a qualita-
tively different universe.
If the weak interaction were substantially weaker, there
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would be no hydrogen around, since it would have been
converted to helium shortly after the Big Bang. If it
were either much stronger or much weaker, the neutrinos
from a supernova explosion would fail to blow away the
outer parts of the star, and it is doubtful whether life-
supporting heavy elements would ever be able to leave
the stars where they were produced. If the protons were
0.2% heavier, they would decay into neutrons unable to
hold onto electrons, so there would be no stable atoms
around. If the proton-to-electron mass ratio were much
smaller, there could be no stable stars, and if it were
much larger, there could be no ordered structures like
crystals and DNA molecules.
Fine-tuning discussions often turn heated when some-
body mentions the “A-word”, anthropic. The author
feels that discussions of the so-called anthropic principle
have generated more heat than light, with many different
definitions and interpretations of what it means. The au-
thor is not aware of anybody disagreeing with what might
be termed MAP, the minimalistic anthropic principle:
• MAP: When testing fundamental theories with ob-
servational data, ignoring selection effects can give
incorrect conclusions.
This is obvious from our examples above: if we neglected
selection effects, we would be surprised to orbit a star as
heavy as the Sun, since lighter and dimmer ones are much
more abundant. Likewise, MAP says that the chaotic in-
flation model is not ruled out by the fact that we find
ourselves living in the minuscule fraction of space where
inflation has ended, since the inflating part is uninhabit-
able to us. Fortunately, selection effects cannot rescue all
models, as pointed out a century ago by Boltzmann. If
the universe were in classical thermal equilibrium (heat
death), thermal fluctuations could still make atoms as-
semble at random to briefly create a self-aware observer
like you once in a blue moon, so the fact that you exist
right now does not rule out the heat death cosmological
model. However, you should statistically expect to find
the rest of the world in a high-entropy mess rather than
in the ordered low-entropy state you observe, which rules
out this model.
The standard model of particle physics has 28 of free
parameters, and cosmology may introduce additional in-
dependent ones. If we really do live in a Level II multi-
verse, then for those parameters that vary between the
parallel universes, we will never be able to predict our
measured values from first principles. We can merely
compute probability distributions for what we should ex-
pect to find, taking selection effects into account. We
should expect to find everything that can vary across the
ensemble to be as generic as is consistent with our exis-
tence. As detailed in Section VB, this issue of what is
“generic” and, more specifically, how to compute prob-
abilities in physics, is emerging as an embarrassingly
thorny problem (see Section VB).
FIG. 5. Difference between Level I and Level III. Whereas
Level I parallel universes are far away in space, those of Level
III are even right here, with quantum events causing classical
reality to split and diverge into parallel storylines. Yet Level
III adds no new storylines beyond levels 1 or 2.
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III. LEVEL III: THE MANY WORLDS OF
QUANTUM PHYSICS
There may be a third type of parallel worlds that are
not far away but in a sense right here. If the fundamental
equations of physics are what mathematicians call uni-
tary, as they so far appear to be, then the universe keeps
branching into parallel universes as in the cartoon (Fig-
ure 5, bottom): whenever a quantum event appears to
have a random outcome, all outcomes in fact occur, one
in each branch. This is the Level III multiverse. Al-
though more debated and controversial than Level I and
Level II, we will see that, surprisingly, this level adds no
new types of universes.
A. Evidence for Level III parallel universes
In the early 20th century, the theory of quantum me-
chanics revolutionized physics by explaining the atomic
realm, with applications ranging from chemistry to nu-
clear reactions, lasers and semiconductors. Despite the
obvious successes in its application, a heated debate en-
sued about its interpretation — a debate that still rages
on. In quantum theory, the state of the universe is not
given in classical terms such as the positions and veloci-
ties of all particles, but by a mathematical object called
a wavefunction. According to the so-called Schro¨dinger
equation, this state evolves deterministically over time
in a fashion termed unitary, corresponding to a rota-
tion in Hilbert space, the abstract infinite-dimensional
space where the wavefunction lives. The sticky part is
that there are perfectly legitimate wavefunctions corre-
sponding to classically counterintuitive situations such
as you being in two different places at once. Worse,
the Schro¨dinger equation can evolve innocent classical
states into such schizophrenic ones. As a baroque ex-
ample, Schro¨dinger described the famous thought exper-
iment where a nasty contraption kills a cat if a radioac-
tive atom decays. Since the radioactive atom eventually
enters a superposition of decayed and not decayed, it pro-
duces a cat which is both dead and alive in superposition.
In the 1920s, this weirdness was explained away by
postulating that that the wavefunction “collapsed” into
some definite classical outcome whenever an observation
was made, with probabilities given by the wavefunction.
Einstein was unhappy about such intrinsic randomness
in nature, which violated unitarity, insisting that “God
doesn’t play dice”, and others complained that there was
no equation specifying when this collapse occurred. In
his 1957 Ph.D. thesis, Princeton student Hugh Everett
III showed that this controversial collapse postulate was
unnecessary. Quantum theory predicted that one clas-
sical reality would gradually split into superpositions of
many (Figure 5). He showed that observers would sub-
jectively experience this splitting merely as a slight ran-
domness, and indeed with probabilities in exact agree-
ment with those from the old collapse postulate (de Witt
2003). This superposition of classical worlds is the Level
III multiverse.
Everett’s work had left two crucial questions unan-
swered: first of all, if the world actually contains bizarre
macrosuperpositions, then why don’t we perceive them?
The answer came in 1970, when Dieter Zeh showed that
the Schro¨dinger equation itself gives rise to a type of cen-
sorship effect (Zeh 1970). This effect became known as
decoherence, and was worked out in great detail by Wo-
jciech Zurek, Zeh and others over the following decades.
Coherent quantum superpositions were found to persist
only as long as they were kept secret from the rest of the
world. A single collision with a snooping photon or air
molecule is sufficient to ensure that our friends in Fig-
ure 5 can never be aware of their counterparts in the
parallel storyline. A second unanswered question in the
Everett picture was more subtle but equally important:
what physical mechanism picks out approximately clas-
sical states (with each object in only one place, etc.) as
special in the bewilderingly large Hilbert space? Deco-
herence answered this question as well, showing that clas-
sical states are simply those that are most robust against
decoherence. In summary, decoherence both identifies
the Level III parallel universes in Hilbert space and de-
limits them from one another. Decoherence is now quite
uncontroversial and has been experimentally measured
in a wide range of circumstances. Since decoherence for
all practical purposes mimics wavefunction collapse, it
has eliminated much of the original motivation for non-
unitary quantum mechanics and made the Everett’s so-
called many worlds interpretation increasingly popular.
For details about these quantum issues, see Tegmark &
Wheeler (2001) for a popular account and Giulini et al.
(1996) for a technical review.
If the time-evolution of the wavefunction is unitary,
then the Level III multiverse exists, so physicists have
worked hard on testing this crucial assumption. So
far, no departures from unitarity have been found. In
the last few decades, remarkable experiments have con-
firmed unitarity for ever larger systems, including the
hefty carbon-60 “Buckey Ball” atom and kilometer-size
optical fiber systems. On the theoretical side, a lead-
ing argument against unitarity has involved possible de-
struction of information during the evaporation of black
holes, suggesting that quantum-gravitational effects are
non-unitary and collapse the wavefunction. However, a
recent string theory breakthrough known as AdS/CFT
correspondence has suggested that even quantum gravity
is unitary, being mathematically equivalent to a lower-
dimensional quantum field theory without gravity (Mal-
dacena 2003).
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B. What are Level III parallel universes like?
When discussing parallel universes, we need to distin-
guish between two different ways of viewing a physical
theory: the outside view or bird perspective of a math-
ematician studying its mathematical fundamental equa-
tions and the inside view or frog perspective of an observer
living in the world described by the equations∗∗∗. From
the bird perspective, the Level III multiverse is simple:
there is only one wavefunction, and it evolves smoothly
and deterministically over time without any sort of split-
ting or parallelism. The abstract quantum world de-
scribed by this evolving wavefunction contains within it a
vast number of parallel classical storylines (see Figure 5),
continuously splitting and merging, as well as a number
of quantum phenomena that lack a classical description.
From her frog perspective, however, each observer per-
ceives only a tiny fraction of this full reality: she can
only see her own Hubble volume (Level I) and decoher-
ence prevents her from perceiving Level III parallel copies
of herself. When she is asked a question, makes a snap
decision and answers (Figure 5), quantum effects at the
neuron level in her brain lead to multiple outcomes, and
from the bird perspective, her single past branches into
multiple futures. From their frog perspectives, however,
each copy of her is unaware of the other copies, and she
perceives this quantum branching as merely a slight ran-
domness. Afterwards, there are for all practical purposes
multiple copies of her that have the exact same memories
up until the point when she answers the question.
∗∗∗Indeed, the standard mental picture of what the physical
world is corresponds to a third intermediate viewpoint that
could be termed the consensus view. From your subjectively
perceived frog perspective, the world turns upside down when
you stand on your head and disappears when you close your
eyes, yet you subconsciously interpret your sensory inputs as
though there is an external reality that is independent of your
orientation, your location and your state of mind. It is strik-
ing that although this third view involves both censorship
(like rejecting dreams), interpolation (as between eye-blinks)
and extrapolation (say attributing existence to unseen cities)
of your inside view, independent observers nonetheless appear
to share this consensus view. Although the inside view looks
black-and-white to a cat, iridescent to a bird seeing four pri-
mary colors, and still more different to bee a seeing polarized
light, a bat using sonar, a blind person with keener touch and
hearing, or the latest overpriced robotic vacuum cleaner, all
agree on whether the door is open. The key current challenge
in physics is deriving this semiclassical consensus view from
the fundamental equations specifying the bird perspective.
In my opinion, this means that although understanding the
detailed nature of human consciousness is an important chal-
lenge in its own right, it is not necessary for a fundamental
theory of physics.
C. How many different parallel universes are there?
As strange as this may sound, Figure 5 illustrates that
this exact same situation occurs even in the Level I mul-
tiverse, the only difference being where her copies reside
(elsewhere in good old three-dimensional space as op-
posed to elsewhere in infinite-dimensional Hilbert space,
in other quantum branches). In this sense, Level III is
no stranger than Level I. Indeed, if physics is unitary,
then the quantum fluctuations during inflation did not
generate unique initial conditions through a random pro-
cess, but rather generated a quantum superposition of all
possible initial conditions simultaneously, after which de-
coherence caused these fluctuations to behave essentially
classically in separate quantum branches. The ergodic
nature of these quantum fluctuations (Section IB) there-
fore implies that the distribution of outcomes in a given
Hubble volume at Level III (between different quantum
branches as in Fig 3) is identical to the distribution that
you get by sampling different Hubble volumes within a
single quantum branch (Level I). If physical constants,
spacetime dimensionality etc. can vary as in Level II, then
they too will vary between parallel quantum branches at
Level III. The reason for this is that if physics is uni-
tary, then the process of spontaneous symmetry break-
ing will not produce a unique (albeit random) outcome,
but rather a superposition of all outcomes that rapidly
decoheres into for all practical purposes separate Level
III branches. In short, the Level III multiverse, if it ex-
ists, adds nothing new beyond Level I and Level II —
just more indistinguishable copies of the same universes,
the same old storylines playing out again and again in
other quantum branches. Postulating a yet unseen non-
unitary effect to get rid of the Level III multiverse, with
Ockham’s Razor in mind, therefore would not make Ock-
ham any happier.
The passionate debate about Everett’s parallel uni-
verses that has raged on for decades therefore seems to be
ending in a grand anticlimax, with the discovery of a less
controversial multiverse that is just as large. This is rem-
iniscent of the famous Shapley-Curtis debate of the 1920s
about whether there were really a multitude of galaxies
(parallel universes by the standards of the time) or just
one, a storm in a teacup now that research has moved on
to other galaxy clusters, superclusters and even Hubble
volumes. In hindsight, both the Shapley-Curtis and Ev-
erett controversies seem positively quaint, reflecting our
instinctive reluctance to expand our horizons.
A common objection is that repeated branching would
exponentially increase the number of universes over time.
However, the number of universes N may well stay con-
stant. By the number of “universes” N , we mean the
number that are indistinguishable from the frog perspec-
tive (from the bird perspective, there is of course just
one) at a given instant, i.e., the number of macroscop-
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ically different Hubble volumes. Although there is ob-
viously a vast number of them (imagine moving plan-
ets to random new locations, imagine having married
someone else, etc.), the number N is clearly finite —
even if we pedantically distinguish Hubble volumes at the
quantum level to be overly conservative, there are “only”
about 1010
115
with temperature below 108K as detailed
above.††† The smooth unitary evolution of the wavefunc-
tion in the bird perspective corresponds to a never-ending
sliding between these N classical universe snapshots from
the frog perspective of an observer. Now you’re in uni-
verse A, the one where you’re reading this sentence. Now
you’re in universe B, the one where you’re reading this
other sentence. Put differently, universe B has an ob-
server identical to one in universe A, except with an extra
instant of memories. In Figure 5, our observer first finds
herself in the universe described by the left panel, but
now there are two different universes smoothly connect-
ing to it like B did to A, and in both of these, she will
be unaware of the other one. Imagine drawing a separate
dot corresponding to each possible universe and drawing
arrows indicating which ones connect to which in the frog
perspective. A dot could lead uniquely to one other dot
or to several, as above. Likewise, several dots could lead
to one and the same dot, since there could be many dif-
†††For the technical reader, could the grand superposition of
the universal wavefunctional involve other interesting states
besides the semiclassical ones? Specifically, the semiclassi-
cal states (corresponding to what we termed the consensus
view) are those that are maximally robust towards decoher-
ence (Zurek 2003), so if we project out the component of
the wavefunctional that is spanned by these states, what re-
mains? We can make a hand-waving argument that all that
remains is a rather uninteresting high-energy mess which will
be devoid of observers and rapidly expand or collapse. Let
us consider the special case of the electromagnetic field. In
many circumstances (Anglin & Zurek 1996), its semiclassi-
cal states can be shown to be generalized coherent states,
which have infinite-dimensional Gaussian Wigner functions
with characteristic widths no narrower than the those cor-
responding to the local temperature. Such functions form
a well-conditioned basis for all states whose wavefunction is
correspondingly smooth, i.e., lacking violent high-energy fluc-
tuations. This is illustrated in Figure 6 for the simple case
of a 1-dimensional quantum particle: the wavefunction ψ(x)
can be written as a superposition of a low energy (low-pass
filtered) and a high-energy (high-pass filtered) part, and the
former can be decomposed as the convolution of a smooth
function with a Gaussian, i.e., as a superposition of coher-
ent states with Gaussian wavepackets. Decoherence rapidly
makes the macroscopically distinct semiclassical states of the
electromagnetic field for all practical purposes separate both
from each other and from the high-energy mess. The high-
energy component may well be typical of the early universe
that we evolved from.
FIG. 6. Schematic illustration (see footnote) of how a wave-
functional of the Level 3 multiverse (top row for simple 1-di-
mensional Hilbert space) can be decomposed as a superposi-
tion of semiclassical worlds (generalized coherent states; mid-
dle row) and a high-energy mess (bottom row).
ferent ways in which certain situations could have come
about. The Level III multiverse thus involves not only
splitting branches but merging branches as well.
Ergodicity implies that the quantum state of the Level
III multiverse is invariant under spatial translations,
which is a unitary operation just as time translation. If it
is invariant under time-translation as well (this can be ar-
ranged by constructing a superposition of an infinite set
of quantum states that are all different time translations
of one and the same state, so that a Big Bang happens
at different times in different quantum branches), then
the number of universes would automatically stay exactly
constant. All possible universe snapshots would exist at
every instant, and the passage of time would just be in
the eye of the beholder — an idea explored in the sci-fi
novel “Permutation City” (Egan 1995) and developed by
Deutsch (1997), Barbour (2001) and others.
D. Two world views
The debate over how classical mechanics emerges from
quantum mechanics continues, and the decoherence dis-
covery has shown that there is a lot more to it than just
letting Planck’s constant h¯ shrink to zero. Yet as Fig-
ure 7 illustrates, this is just a small piece of a larger puz-
zle. Indeed, the endless debate over the interpretation of
quantum mechanics — and even the broader issue of par-
allel universes — is in a sense the tip of an iceberg. In the
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FIG. 7. Theories can be crudely organized into a family
tree where each might, at least in principle, be derivable from
more fundamental ones above it. For example, classical me-
chanics can be obtained from special relativity in the approx-
imation that the speed of light c is infinite. Most of the ar-
rows are less well understood. All these theories have two
components: mathematical equations and words that explain
how they are connected to what we observe. At each level
in the hierarchy of theories, new words (e.g., protons, atoms,
cells, organisms, cultures) are introduced because they are
convenient, capturing the essence of what is going on with-
out recourse to the more fundamental theory above it. It is
important to remember, however, that it is we humans who
introduce these concepts and the words for them: in princi-
ple, everything could have been derived from the fundamental
theory at the top of the tree, although such an extreme re-
ductionist approach would of course be useless in practice.
Crudely speaking, the ratio of equations to words decreases
as we move down the tree, dropping near zero for highly ap-
plied fields such as medicine and sociology. In contrast, theo-
ries near the top are highly mathematical, and physicists are
still struggling to understand the concepts, if any, in terms
of which we can understand them. The Holy Grail of physics
is to find what is jocularly referred to as a “Theory of Ev-
erything”, or TOE, from which all else can be derived. If
such a theory exists at all, it should replace the big question
mark at the top of the theory tree. Everybody knows that
something is missing here, since we lack a consistent theory
unifying gravity with quantum mechanics.
Sci-Fi spoof “Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy”, the an-
swer is discovered to be “42”, and the hard part is finding
the real question. Questions about parallel universes may
seem to be just about as deep as queries about reality can
get. Yet there is a still deeper underlying question: there
are two tenable but diametrically opposed paradigms re-
garding physical reality and the status of mathematics,
a dichotomy that arguably goes as far back as Plato and
Aristotle, and the question is which one is correct.
• ARISTOTELIAN PARADIGM: The subjec-
tively perceived frog perspective is physically real,
and the bird perspective and all its mathematical
language is merely a useful approximation.
• PLATONIC PARADIGM: The bird perspec-
tive (the mathematical structure) is physically real,
and the frog perspective and all the human lan-
guage we use to describe it is merely a useful ap-
proximation for describing our subjective percep-
tions.
What is more basic — the frog perspective or the bird
perspective? What is more basic — human language
or mathematical language? Your answer will determine
how you feel about parallel universes. If you prefer the
Platonic paradigm, you should find multiverses natu-
ral, since our feeling that say the Level III multiverse
is “weird” merely reflects that the frog and bird perspec-
tives are extremely different. We break the symmetry by
calling the latter weird because we were all indoctrinated
with the Aristotelian paradigm as children, long before
we even heard of mathematics - the Platonic view is an
acquired taste!
In the second (Platonic) case, all of physics is ulti-
mately a mathematics problem, since an infinitely intel-
ligent mathematician given the fundamental equations of
the cosmos could in principle compute the frog perspec-
tive, i.e., compute what self-aware observers the universe
would contain, what they would perceive, and what lan-
guage they would invent to describe their perceptions
to one another. In other words, there is a “Theory of
Everything” (TOE) at the top of the tree in Figure 7
whose axioms are purely mathematical, since postulates
in English regarding interpretation would be derivable
and thus redundant. In the Aristotelian paradigm, on
the other hand, there can never be a TOE, since one is
ultimately just explaining certain verbal statements by
other verbal statements — this is known as the infinite
regress problem (Nozick 1981).
IV. LEVEL IV: OTHER MATHEMATICAL
STRUCTURES
Suppose you buy the Platonist paradigm and believe
that there really is a TOE at the top of Figure 7 — and
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that we simply have not found the correct equations yet.
Then an embarrassing question remains, as emphasized
by John Archibald Wheeler: Why these particular equa-
tions, not others? Let us now explore the idea of mathe-
matical democracy, whereby universes governed by other
equations are equally real. This is the Level IV multi-
verse. First we need to digest two other ideas, however:
the concept of a mathematical structure, and the notion
that the physical world may be one.
A. What is a mathematical structure?
Many of us think of mathematics as a bag of tricks that
we learned in school for manipulating numbers. Yet most
mathematicians have a very different view of their field.
They study more abstract objects such as functions, sets,
spaces and operators and try to prove theorems about
the relations between them. Indeed, some modern math-
ematics papers are so abstract that the only numbers
you will find in them are the page numbers! What does
a dodecahedron have in common with a set of complex
numbers? Despite the plethora of mathematical struc-
tures with intimidating names like orbifolds and Killing
fields, a striking underlying unity that has emerged in the
last century: all mathematical structures are just special
cases of one and the same thing: so-called formal sys-
tems. A formal system consists of abstract symbols and
rules for manipulating them, specifying how new strings
of symbols referred to as theorems can be derived from
given ones referred to as axioms. This historical devel-
opment represented a form of deconstructionism, since it
stripped away all meaning and interpretation that had
traditionally been given to mathematical structures and
distilled out only the abstract relations capturing their
very essence. As a result, computers can now prove the-
orems about geometry without having any physical intu-
ition whatsoever about what space is like.
Figure 8 shows some of the most basic mathematical
structures and their interrelations. Although this fam-
ily tree probably extends indefinitely, it illustrates that
there is nothing fuzzy about mathematical structures.
They are “out there” in the sense that mathematicians
discover them rather than create them, and that contem-
plative alien civilizations would find the same structures
(a theorem is true regardless of whether it is proven by
a human, a computer or an alien).
B. The possibility that the physical world is a
mathematical structure
Let us now digest the idea that physical world (specif-
ically, the Level III multiverse) is a mathematical struc-
ture. Although traditionally taken for granted by many
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infinite in extent — the figure shows merely a small sample
near the bottom.
theoretical physicists, this is a deep and far-reaching no-
tion. It means that mathematical equations describe not
merely some limited aspects of the physical world, but all
aspects of it. It means that there is some mathematical
structure that is what mathematicians call isomorphic
(and hence equivalent) to our physical world, with each
physical entity having a unique counterpart in the math-
ematical structure and vice versa. Let us consider some
examples.
A century ago, when classical physics still reigned
supreme, many scientists believed that physical space
was isomorphic to the mathematical structure known as
R3: three-dimensional Euclidean space. Moreover, some
thought that all forms of matter in the universe cor-
responded to various classical fields: the electric field,
the magnetic field and perhaps a few undiscovered ones,
mathematically corresponding to functions on R3 (a
handful of numbers at each point in space). In this
view (later proven incorrect), dense clumps of matter like
atoms were simply regions in space where some fields
were strong (where some numbers were large). These
fields evolved deterministically over time according to
some partial differential equations, and observers per-
ceived this as things moving around and events taking
place. Could, then, fields in three-dimensional space
be the mathematical structure corresponding to the uni-
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verse? No, since a mathematical structure cannot change
— it is an abstract, immutable entity existing outside of
space and time. Our familiar frog perspective of a three-
dimensional space where events unfold is equivalent, from
the bird perspective, to a four-dimensional spacetime
where all of history is contained, so the mathematical
structure would be fields in four-dimensional space. In
other words, if history were a movie, the mathematical
structure would not correspond to a single frame of it,
but to the entire videotape.
Given a mathematical structure, we will say that it has
physical existence if any self-aware substructure (SAS)
within it subjectively, from its frog perspective, perceives
itself as living in a physically real world. What would,
mathematically, such an SAS be like? In the classical
physics example above, an SAS such as you would be
a tube through spacetime, a thick version of what Ein-
stein referred to as a world-line. The location of the tube
would specify your position in space at different times.
Within the tube, the fields would exhibit certain complex
behavior, corresponding to storing and processing infor-
mation about the field-values in the surroundings, and
at each position along the tube, these processes would
give rise to the familiar but mysterious sensation of self-
awareness.From its frog perspective, the SAS would per-
ceive this one-dimensional string of perceptions along the
tube as passage of time.
Although our example illustrates the idea of how our
physical world can be a mathematical structure, this par-
ticular mathematical structure (fields in four-dimensional
space) is now known to be the wrong one. After real-
izing that spacetime could be curved, Einstein doggedly
searched for a so-called unified field theory where the uni-
verse was what mathematicians call a 3+1-dimensional
pseudo-Riemannian manifold with tensor fields, but this
failed to account for the observed behavior of atoms. Ac-
cording to quantum field theory, the modern synthesis of
special relativity theory and quantum theory, the uni-
verse (in this case the Level III multiverse) is a mathe-
matical structure known as an algebra of operator-valued
fields. Here the question of what constitutes an SAS is
more subtle (Tegmark 2000). However, this fails to de-
scribe black hole evaporation, the first instance of the
Big Bang and other quantum gravity phenomena, so the
true mathematical structure isomorphic to our universe,
if it exists, has not yet been found.
C. Mathematical democracy
Now suppose that our physical world really is a math-
ematical structure, and that you are an SAS within it.
This means that in the Mathematics tree of Figure 8, one
of the boxes is our universe. (The full tree is probably
infinite in extent, so our particular box is not one of the
few boxes from the bottom of the tree that are shown.)
In other words, this particular mathematical structure
enjoys not only mathematical existence, but physical ex-
istence as well. What about all the other boxes in the
tree? Do they too enjoy physical existence? If not, there
would be a fundamental, unexplained ontological asym-
metry built into the very heart of reality, splitting mathe-
matical structures into two classes: those with and with-
out physical existence. As a way out of this philosophical
conundrum, I have suggested (Tegmark 1998) that com-
plete mathematical democracy holds: that mathemat-
ical existence and physical existence are equivalent, so
that all mathematical structures exist physically as well.
This is the Level IV multiverse. It can be viewed as a
form of radical Platonism, asserting that the mathemat-
ical structures in Plato’s realm of ideas, the Mindscape
of Rucker (1982), exist “out there” in a physical sense
(Davies 1993), casting the so-called modal realism the-
ory of David Lewis (1986) in mathematical terms akin to
what Barrow (1991; 1992) refers to as “pi in the sky”. If
this theory is correct, then since it has no free parame-
ters, all properties of all parallel universes (including the
subjective perceptions of SASs in them) could in princi-
ple be derived by an infinitely intelligent mathematician.
D. Evidence for a Level IV multiverse
We have described the four levels of parallel universes
in order of increasing speculativeness, so why should we
believe in Level IV? Logically, it rests on two separate
assumptions:
• Assumption 1: That the physical world (specif-
ically our level III multiverse) is a mathematical
structure
• Assumption 2: Mathematical democracy: that
all mathematical structures exist “out there” in the
same sense
In a famous essay, Wigner (1967) argued that “the
enormous usefulness of mathematics in the natural sci-
ences is something bordering on the mysterious”, and
that “there is no rational explanation for it”. This argu-
ment can be taken as support for assumption 1: here the
utility of mathematics for describing the physical world
is a natural consequence of the fact that the latter is
a mathematical structure, and we are simply uncover-
ing this bit by bit. The various approximations that
constitute our current physics theories are successful be-
cause simple mathematical structures can provide good
approximations of how a SAS will perceive more complex
mathematical structures. In other words, our successful
theories are not mathematics approximating physics, but
mathematics approximating mathematics. Wigner’s ob-
servation is unlikely to be based on fluke coincidences,
since far more mathematical regularity in nature has been
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discovered in the decades since he made it, including the
standard model of particle physics.
A second argument supporting assumption 1 is that
abstract mathematics is so general that any TOE that is
definable in purely formal terms (independent of vague
human terminology) is also a mathematical structure.
For instance, a TOE involving a set of different types
of entities (denoted by words, say) and relations between
them (denoted by additional words) is nothing but what
mathematicians call a set-theoretical model, and one can
generally find a formal system that it is a model of.
This argument also makes assumption 2 more appeal-
ing, since it implies that any conceivable parallel uni-
verse theory can be described at Level IV. The Level IV
multiverse, termed the “ultimate Ensemble theory” in
Tegmark (1997) since it subsumes all other ensembles,
therefore brings closure to the hierarchy of multiverses,
and there cannot be say a Level V. Considering an en-
semble of mathematical structures does not add anything
new, since this is still just another mathematical struc-
ture. What about the frequently discussed notion that
the universe is a computer simulation? This idea occurs
frequently in science fiction and has been substantially
elaborated (e.g., Schmidthuber 1997; Wolfram 2002).
The information content (memory state) of a digital com-
puter is a string of bits, say “1001011100111001...” of
great but finite length, equivalent to some large but fi-
nite integer n written in binary. The information pro-
cessing of a computer is a deterministic rule for chang-
ing each memory state into another (applied over and
over again), so mathematically, it is simply a function f
mapping the integers onto themselves that gets iterated:
n 7→ f(n) 7→ f(f(n)) 7→ .... In other words, even the
most sophisticated computer simulation is just yet an-
other special case of a mathematical structure, and is al-
ready included in the Level IV multiverse. (Incidentally,
iterating continuous functions rather than integer-valued
ones can give rise to fractals.)
Another appealing feature of assumption 2 is that it
provides the only answer so far to Wheeler’s question:
Why these particular equations, not others? Having uni-
verses dance to the tune of all possible equations also
resolves the fine-tuning problem of Section II C once and
for all, even at the fundamental equation level: although
many if not most mathematical structures are likely to
be dead and devoid of SASs, failing to provide the com-
plexity, stability and predictability that SASs require, we
of course expect to find with 100% probability that we
inhabit a mathematical structure capable of supporting
life. Because of this selection effect, the answer to the
question “what is it that breathes fire into the equations
and makes a universe for them to describe?” (Hawking
1993) would then be “you, the SAS”.
E. What are Level IV parallel universes like?
The way we use, test and potentially rule out any the-
ory is to compute probability distributions for our future
perceptions given our past perceptions and to compare
these predictions with our observed outcome. In a mul-
tiverse theory, there is typically more than one SAS that
has experienced a past life identical to yours, so there is
no way to determine which one is you. To make predic-
tions, you therefore have to compute what fractions of
them will perceive what in the future, which leads to the
following predictions:
• Prediction 1: The mathematical structure de-
scribing our world is the most generic one that is
consistent with our observations.
• Prediction 2: Our future observations are the
most generic ones that are consistent with our past
observations.
• Prediction 3: Our past observations are the most
generic ones that are consistent with our existence.
We will return to the problem of what “generic” means
in
secMeasureSec (the measure problem). However, one
striking feature of mathematical structures, discussed in
detail in Tegmark (1997), is that the sort of symmetry
and invariance properties that are responsible for the sim-
plicity and orderliness of our universe tend to be generic,
more the rule than the exception — mathematical struc-
tures tend to have them by default, and complicated ad-
ditional axioms etc. must be added to make them go
away. In other words, because of both this and selec-
tion effects, we should not necessarily expect life in the
Level IV multiverse to be a disordered mess.
V. DISCUSSION
We have surveyed scientific theories of parallel uni-
verses, and found that they naturally form a four-level
hierarchy of multiverses (Figure 1) allowing progressively
greater differences from our own universe:
• Level I: Other Hubble volumes have different initial
conditions
• Level II: Other post-inflation bubbles may have dif-
ferent effective laws of physics (constants, dimen-
sionality, particle content)
• Level III: Other branches of the quantum wavefunc-
tion add nothing qualitatively new
• Level IV: Other mathematical structures have dif-
ferent fundamental equations of physics
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Whereas the Level I universes join seemlessly, there are
clear demarcations between those within levels II and III
caused by inflating space and decoherence, respectively.
The level IV universes are completely separate and need
to be considered together only for predicting your future,
since “you” may exist in more than one of them.
Although it was Level I that got Giordano Bruno
in trouble with the inquisition, few astronomers today
would suggest that space ends abruptly at the edge of the
observable universe. It is ironic and perhaps due to his-
toric coincidence that Level III is the one that has drawn
the most fire in the past decades, since it is the only one
that adds no qualitatively new types of universes.
A. Future prospects
There are ample future prospects for testing and per-
haps ruling out these multiverse theories. In the com-
ing decade, dramatically improved cosmological measure-
ments of the microwave background radiation, the large-
scale matter distribution, etc., will test Level I by fur-
ther constraining the curvature and topology of space and
will test level II by providing stringent tests of inflation.
Progress in both astrophysics and high-energy physics
should also clarify the extent to which various physical
constants are fine-tuned, thereby weakening or strength-
ening the case for Level II. If the current world-wide effort
to build quantum computers succeeds, it will provide fur-
ther evidence for Level III, since they would, in essence,
be exploiting the parallelism of the Level III multiverse
for parallel computation (Deutsch 1997). Conversely, ex-
perimental evidence of unitarity violation would rule out
Level III. Finally, success or failure in the grand challenge
of modern physics, unifying general relativity and quan-
tum field theory, will shed more light on Level IV. Either
we will eventually find a mathematical structure match-
ing our universe, or we will bump up against a limit to
the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics and have
to abandon Level IV.
B. The measure problem
There are also interesting theoretical issues to resolve
within the multiverse theories, first and foremost the
measure problem. As multiverse theories gain credence,
the sticky issue of how to compute probabilities in physics
is growing from a minor nuisance into a major embarrass-
ment. The reason why probabilities become so important
is that if there are indeed many copies of “you” with iden-
tical past lives and memories, you could not compute
your own future even if you had complete knowledge of
the entire state of the multiverse. This is because there
is no way for you to determine which of these copies is
“you” (they all feel that they are). All you can predict
is therefore probabilities for what you will observe, cor-
responding to the fractions of these observers that expe-
rience different things. Unfortunately, computing what
fraction of the infinitely many observers perceive what
is very subtle, since the answer depends on the order in
which you count them! The fraction of the integers that
are even is 50% if you order them 1, 2, 3, 4..., but ap-
proaches 100% if you order them alphabetically the way
your word processor would (1, 10, 100, 1000, ...). When
observers reside in disconnected universes, there is no ob-
viously natural way in which to order them, and one must
sample from the different universes with some statistical
weights referred to by mathematicians as a “measure”.
This problem crops up in a mild and treatable manner
in Level I, becomes severe at Level II, has caused much
debate within the context of extracting quantum proba-
bilities in Level III (de Witt 2003), and is horrendous at
Level IV. At Level II, for instance, Vilenkin and others
have published predictions for the probability distribu-
tions of various cosmological parameters by arguing that
different parallel universes that have inflated by differ-
ent amounts should be given statistical weights propor-
tional to their volume (e.g., Garriga & Vilenkin 2001a).
On the other hand, any mathematician will tell you that
2×∞ =∞, so that there is no objective sense in which
an infinite universe that that has expanded by a factor of
two has gotten larger. Indeed, an exponentially inflating
universe has what mathematicians call a time-like Killing
vector, which means that it is time-translationally invari-
ant and hence unchanging from a mathematical point of
view. Moreover, a flat universe with finite volume and
the topology of a torus is equivalent to a perfectly peri-
odic universe with infinite volume, both from the mathe-
matical bird perspective and from the frog perspective of
an observer within it, so why should its infinitely smaller
volume give it zero statistical weight? Since Hubble vol-
umes start repeating even in the Level I multiverse (albeit
in a random order, not periodically) after about 1010
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meters, should infinite space really be given more sta-
tistical weight than a finite region of that size? This
problem must be solved to observationally test models
of stochastic inflation. If you thought that was bad,
consider the problem of assigning statistical weights to
different mathematical structures at Level IV. The fact
that our universe seems relatively simple has led many
people to suggest that the correct measure somehow in-
volves complexity. For instance, one could reward sim-
plicity by weighting each mathematical structure by 2−n,
where n is its algorithmic information content measured
in bits, defined as the length of the shortest bit string
(computer program, say) that would specify it (Chaitin
1987). This would correspond to equal weights for all
infinite bit strings (each representable as a real number
like .101011101...), not for all mathematical structures.
If there is such an exponential penalty for high complex-
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ity, we should probably expect to find ourselves inhabit-
ing one of the simplest mathematical structures complex
enough to contain observers. However, the algorithmic
complexity depends on how structures are mapped to bit
strings (Chaitin 1987; Deutsch 2003), and it far from ob-
vious whether there exists a most natural definition that
reality might subscribe to.
C. The pros and cons of parallel universes
So should you believe in parallel universes? Let us
conclude with a brief discussion of arguments pro and
con. First of all, we have seen that this is not a yes/no
question — rather, the most interesting issue is whether
there are 0, 1, 2, 3 or 4 levels of multiverses. Figure 1
summarizes evidence for the different levels. Cosmology
observations support Level I by pointing to a flat infi-
nite space with ergodic matter distribution, and Level
I plus inflation elegantly eliminates the initial condition
problem. Level II is supported by the success of infla-
tion theory in explaining cosmological observations, and
it can explain apparent fine-tuning of physical param-
eters. Level III is supported by both experimental and
theoretical evidence for unitarity, and explains the appar-
ent quantum randomness that bothered Einstein so much
without abandoning causality from the bird perspective.
Level IV explains Wigner’s unreasonable effectiveness of
mathematics for describing physics and answers the ques-
tion “why these equations, not others?”.
The principal arguments against parallel universes are
that they are wasteful and weird, so let us consider these
two objections in turn. The first argument is that mul-
tiverse theories are vulnerable to Ockham’s razor, since
they postulate the existence of other worlds that we can
never observe. Why should nature be so ontologically
wasteful and indulge in such opulence as to contain an in-
finity of different worlds? Intriguingly, this argument can
be turned around to argue for a multiverse. When we feel
that nature is wasteful, what precisely are we disturbed
about her wasting? Certainly not “space”, since the stan-
dard flat universe model with its infinite volume draws no
such objections. Certainly not “mass” or “atoms” either,
for the same reason — once you have wasted an infinite
amount of something, who cares if you waste some more?
Rather, it is probably the apparent reduction in simplic-
ity that appears disturbing, the quantity of information
necessary to specify all these unseen worlds. However, as
is discussed in more detail in Tegmark (1996), an entire
ensemble is often much simpler than one of its mem-
bers. For instance, the algorithmic information content
of a generic integer n is of order log2 n (Chaitin 1987),
the number of bits required to write it out in binary.
Nonetheless, the set of all integers 1, 2, 3, ... can be gen-
erated by quite a trivial computer program, so the algo-
rithmic complexity of the whole set is smaller than that of
a generic member. Similarly, the set of all perfect fluid
solutions to the Einstein field equations has a smaller
algorithmic complexity than a generic particular solu-
tion, since the former is specified simply by giving a few
equations and the latter requires the specification of vast
amounts of initial data on some hypersurface. Loosely
speaking, the apparent information content rises when
we restrict our attention to one particular element in an
ensemble, thus losing the symmetry and simplicity that
was inherent in the totality of all elements taken together.
In this sense, the higher level multiverses have less algo-
rithmic complexity. Going from our universe to the Level
I multiverse eliminates the need to specify initial condi-
tions, upgrading to Level II eliminates the need to spec-
ify physical constants and the Level IV multiverse of all
mathematical structures has essentially no algorithmic
complexity at all. Since it is merely in the frog perspec-
tive, in the subjective perceptions of observers, that this
opulence of information and complexity is really there, a
multiverse theory is arguably more economical than one
endowing only a single ensemble element with physical
existence (Tegmark 1996).
The second common complaint about multiverses is
that they are weird. This objection is aesthetic rather
than scientific, and as mentioned above, really only
makes sense in the Aristotelian world view. In the Pla-
tonic paradigm, one might expect observers to complain
that the correct TOE was weird if the bird perspective
was sufficiently different from the frog perspective, and
there is every indication that this is the case for us. The
perceived weirdness is hardly surprising, since evolution
provided us with intuition only for the everyday physics
that had survival value for our distant ancestors. Thanks
to clever inventions, we have glimpsed slightly more than
the frog perspective of our normal inside view, and sure
enough, we have encountered bizarre phenomena when-
ever departing from human scales in any way: at high
speeds (time slows down), on small scales (quantum par-
ticles can be at several places at once), on large scales
(black holes), at low temperatures (liquid Helium can
flow upward), at high temperatures (colliding particles
can change identity), etc. As a result, physicists have by
and large already accepted that the frog and bird per-
spectives are very different, A prevalent modern view
of quantum field theory is that the standard model is
merely an effective theory, a low-energy limit of a yet to
be discovered theory that is even more removed from our
cozy classical concepts (involving strings in 10 dimen-
sions, say). Many experimentalists are becoming blase´
about producing so many “weird” (but perfectly repeat-
able) experimental results, and simply accept that the
world is a weirder place than we thought it was and get
on with their calculations.
We have seen that a common feature of all four mul-
tiverse levels is that the simplest and arguably most el-
egant theory involves parallel universes by default, and
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that one needs to complicate the theory by adding exper-
imentally unsupported processes and ad hoc postulates
(finite space, wavefunction collapse, ontological asymme-
try, etc.) to explain away the parallel universes. Our
aesthetic judgement therefore comes down to what we
find more wasteful and inelegant: many worlds or many
words. Perhaps we will gradually get more used to the
weird ways of our cosmos, and even find its strangeness
to be part of its charm.
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